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Unveiling the Structure of 
Unconventional Organized Crime 
Investigating and Prosecuting Criminal Networks within and beyond European Borders 
Simona Autolitano and Verena Zoppei 
In the last decades, the traditional understanding of organized crime (OC) has been widely 
challenged. As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Europol, as well 
as German authorities have extensively highlighted, hierarchical criminal organizations 
coexist and overlap with new forms of liquid networked criminality. These criminal 
networks are composed of flexible alliances between professionals acting worldwide 
that regulate themselves based on market logic rather than violent conflicts. While 
appearing “dis-organized,” these criminal networks are highly resilient to law enforce-
ment intervention due to their redundancy. Their capacity for infiltrating the legiti-
mate economy and the estimated sums of money they launder globally, which amounts 
to between 2 and 5 percent of global GDP yearly (UNODC), are alarming. Therefore, not 
only law enforcement and policymakers, but also the private sector cannot afford to 
drop their guard. National interventions often just push criminal activities into other 
countries; hence, effective strategies should address global markets’ dynamics. 
 
Policy documents increasingly refer to OC 
as a serious threat that undermines the licit 
economy. The European Commission 2015 
Agenda on Security and the 2016 European 
Union (EU) Global Strategy list OC among 
the core security challenges for the Union. 
Although in theory the social, economic, 
and political impacts of criminal networks 
have been long acknowledged, in practice 
investigating and prosecuting new forms of 
OC, whose structure is barely perceivable, is 
rather complex. 
The analysis of investigation files, reports, 
and final decisions of three significant OC 
proceedings concluded in recent years by 
German authorities – human smuggling, 
cybercrime, and money laundering – offers 
insights into the strengths and loopholes of 
current law enforcement practices. In par-
ticular, three concrete issues emerge. The 
first concerns investigating and prosecut-
ing non-hierarchical forms of networked 
criminality, which at first appear to be a 
multitude of individual offenders. The 
second outcome refers to the implementa-
tion of the follow-the-money strategy and 
the difficulty of engaging non-law enforce-
ment actors in the prevention of money 
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laundering. Despite all cases originating 
from investigations conducted in Germany, 
the criminal networks operate cross-border, 
leading to the third point, which deals with 
the necessity of further cooperation within 
and beyond the EU. 
Seek Structure 
First, traditional offenders-oriented law 
enforcement interventions, which target 
“intensive offenders,” are successful when 
dealing with conventional pyramidal OC 
groups, but they are not appropriate for 
dismantling horizontal criminal structures. 
In fact, as long as there is standing demand, 
criminal networks adapt to any loss of per-
sonnel. For the sake of efficiency and con-
venience, criminal cases concerning a plu-
rality of actors are often tried separately. 
Yet, investigators should consider the pos-
sibility that offenders who seem to be act-
ing independently might actually be part of 
the same criminal network. Investigations 
focusing on top-ranking criminals should 
serve as entry points for further law enforce-
ment activity directed at dismantling the 
underlying networks by targeting “crime 
enablers,” namely those individuals acting 
in the gray area. 
The first example relating to human 
smuggling illustrates how – by convicting 
only the main suspect – the activity of law 
enforcement did not affect the criminal 
network. Despite the investigations reveal-
ing the existence of a complex structure, 
which – driven by the demand of Vietna-
mese people willing to migrate to Europe – 
was able to promptly respond and present 
itself as a legitimate business, only one 
offender was sentenced. As the judicial files 
of the case show, investigations have been 
built around the irregular employment of 
Vietnamese workers in several nail studios 
around Germany owned by the main sus-
pect. Those workers had been smuggled 
into Germany. Extensive financial investi-
gations that involved banks, tax authori-
ties, and employment agencies, gathered a 
remarkable quantity of data and revealed 
the involvement of “crime enablers,” who 
profited from the smuggling activity. Based 
on falsified invitation letters, tourist Schen-
gen visas were first issued by the German 
Embassy in Hanoi. Once the migrants arrived 
in Germany, those temporary visas were 
converted into permanent residence per-
mits through forged marriage certificates 
or family reunifications with European 
nationals “recruited” during the commer-
cial activities of the nail studios. Counter-
feit identity cards, university degrees, and 
language certificates were provided by two 
professionals residing in Italy. Yet, none of 
the individuals acting in the gray area were 
convicted. It can be thus expected that, 
given the criminal networks’ resilience, 
smuggling services will continue to be pro-
vided in the absence of convenient lawful 
alternatives. 
Financial investigations often reveal the 
existence of unlawfully obtained assets 
without being able to prove the actual com-
missioning of the predicate offenses. These 
investigations present a high burden in 
terms of costs and resources employed. The 
German government has recently adopted 
draft legislation to reform criminal law 
regarding asset forfeiture. The legislation 
will allow – in the context of OC investiga-
tions – for the confiscation of assets whose 
lawful origin cannot be proved by the sus-
pect if there is substantiated suspicion that 
they have been obtained illicitly. If approved, 
this reform would represent an important 
step forward in overcoming the difficulties 
of financial investigations and aligning 
German law with standards being applied 
already in several jurisdictions worldwide. 
Trying cases together for different of-
fenders who seem to be related has proven 
to be effective in dismantling criminal net-
works. The second selected example – refer-
ring to cybercriminal networks – is a good 
practice example. Individual investigations 
for computer fraud had begun in various 
public prosecutor offices around Germany. 
Only through further investigations was 
the presence of a wider cybercriminal net-
work acting in the United Kingdom, Russia, 
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and Germany revealed. Following the merg-
ing of the cases, it was disclosed that per-
petrators were highly skilled professional 
hackers who were part of an international, 
well-structured, illegal firm that was selling 
stolen data to third parties, causing damage 
of at least €1.3 million. Data of online 
banking systems hacked through malicious 
software were sold through intermediaries 
to OC groups. These groups were mainly 
involved in money laundering and used un-
suspicious private bank accounts to trans-
fer monies originating from criminal activ-
ities in order to give them an appearance of 
legitimacy. If investigations had been con-
ducted individually and focused on the in-
dividual hackers, the existence of the net-
work, the linkages with the other OC groups, 
and the money laundering activities would 
not have been detected. Despite being time- 
and cost-intensive, merging criminal cases 
turns out to be an effective tool for disman-
tling unconventional OC structures. 
The Follow-the-Money Strategy 
Second, the follow-the-money strategy 
needs to be reviewed according to the out-
comes of the implementation of anti-money 
laundering measures. Although there is 
considerable theoretical evidence that the 
follow-the-money strategy helps to combat 
OC, in reality tracing money flows is not 
always effective. Historically considered the 
Achilles’ heel of OC due to the risk of detec-
tion, the laundering of money through 
legitimate economic and financial means 
has instead become advantageous for the 
offenders. Money launderers take advantage 
of ever-new emerging financial vehicles and 
economic sectors that are, in principle, law-
ful. Limiting the use of vehicles created 
originally for licit goals in order to avoid 
their abuse for illicit purposes means being 
confronted with the possibility of violating 
established economic and civil rights and 
facing legitimate claims. The third selected 
example concerning a German-based crimi-
nal network offering money laundering ser-
vices worldwide, from Germany to Australia, 
shows how a combination of newer and 
older transaction methods is used to avoid 
law enforcement detection. In particular, 
the criminal syndicate used the so-called 
cuckoo smurfing, a highly sophisticated 
method of money laundering based on the 
informal value-transfer system “Hawala 
banking.” Offenders acting as legitimate 
Hawala remitters took advantage of cus-
tomers by replacing their licit monies with 
ill-gotten gains. Meanwhile, the same 
amount of illicit cash was collected in the 
country of destination and transferred to 
the designated recipient. Using informal 
payment methods, the criminal syndicate 
could act for long periods without being 
detected by supervisory authorities that 
monitor financial transactions. The cash 
resulting from the laundering process, 
which had an appearance of legitimacy, 
was then moved between import-export 
companies to justify the transfer through 
fictitious invoicing. Again, the use of shell 
companies allowed criminals to conceal 
their identities. Regulations that try to in-
clude the variety of mechanisms utilized by 
money launderers need to impose restric-
tions on activities that are, in principle, 
legitimate. Given the ambivalent nature of 
those tools and the fact that they are often 
used to commit less serious, victimless 
offenses, policymakers often need to make 
a compromise between criminal prosecu-
tion and economic interests. The current 
debate on the limitation of cash trans-
actions is a prime example. As reported by 
Europol in 2015, the use of cash is almost 
unavoidable at a certain stage in the laun-
dering process, even when virtual curren-
cies or complex financial subterfuges are 
utilized. Yet, cash is, in principle, a legiti-
mate payment method. Policymakers need 
to strike a delicate balance also when in-
cluding in the regulations informal value-
transfer systems. If excluding such forms 
of money remittance from the regulations 
means opening up the possibility for abuse, 
banning them would impede legitimate 
transactions in the absence of formal finan-
cial structures. 
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Also considered highly controversial are 
those financial instruments granting secre-
cy, such as trusts, shell companies, Bitcoins, 
and safe deposit boxes, which were created 
originally for protecting the assets of per-
secuted individuals but then abused by 
offenders who began using them to conceal 
their identities. Although the disclosure of 
beneficial corporate ownership is desired 
to discern law-abiding users from criminals, 
supervisory and investigative authorities 
should be further supported to ensure the 
effective processing of collected data. Pri-
vate-sector intelligence providers such as 
banks and real estate agents, which have 
been involved in the prevention of money 
laundering, should be further supported 
with information about the risks presented 
by the infiltration of illegal monies, demol-
ishing the idea that pecunia non olet. 
International Cooperation 
Third, given the cross-border nature of net-
worked criminality, which is evident also 
from the three proceedings examined, co-
operation among national law enforcement 
agencies is essential. The EU’s strategy for 
fighting OC has been to attempt more co-
operation and compliance at the European 
level. The Union has fostered mutual recog-
nition among judicial authorities with 
regard to the gathering of evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings, the establishment of Joint 
Investigations Teams, the harmonization 
of laws to freeze and confiscate the instru-
mentalities and proceeds of crime, as well 
as of laws to prevent money laundering. 
However, the implementation of such 
measures is far from being a reality. In fact, 
a consensus among EU Member States on 
a definition of OC does not seem to be fea-
sible. Furthermore, the considerable room 
for discretion that is left to national gov-
ernments, the unsystematic extension of 
grounds for refusal, and the possibility of 
non-participation in the scope of Directives 
open the potential for “venue shopping,” 
thus favoring criminals. The absence of 
harmonized laws among EU Member States, 
for example with regard to the collection 
of digital evidence, results in cumbersome 
cooperation. In the context of computer-
related crime, e-evidence is often the only 
tool for detecting hackers’ real identities, 
locations, and relationships with other OC 
groups. As the cybercrime example illus-
trates, despite national authorities having 
gathered a significant amount of data, sen-
tencing the offenders was not an easy task 
due to the differences in national standards 
for the admissibility of digital evidence. 
Given that surveillance is highly controver-
sial because it collides with data protection 
and privacy rights, there is the necessity for 
a clear and comprehensive international – 
or at least European – legal framework re-
lating to e-evidence that ensures the respect 
of fundamental rights. 
Adopting effective regulations at the Euro-
pean level would lead to a spillover effect 
beyond the Union’s borders without actually 
eliminating OC. Therefore, the EU should 
support further international cooperation 
by providing an example of strong commit-
ment, without exporting its own standards 
and definitions to third countries. 
Dis-organized Does Not Mean 
Less Serious 
Finally, narratives on less violent and less 
organized criminal networks should not 
lead one to underestimate the seriousness 
of such forms of OC. Although professional 
criminals tend to minimize the use of vio-
lence to avoid unwanted attention, their 
capacity for infiltration into the licit world 
is a security threat. Criminal justice-based 
solutions alone are not sufficient. There is 
a growing consensus on the necessity for 
enhanced regulations in the economic and 
financial systems to prevent the abuse of 
instruments that are perceived first and 
foremost as being legitimate. This requires 
a strong political will that can outweigh 
the interests at play. 
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